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Abstract  We  analyze  the  effect  of  two  types  of  corporate  diversiﬁcation  (business  diversiﬁ-
cation and  ownership  diversiﬁcation)  on  the  market  value  of  the  Chilean  ﬁrms.  For  a  sample
of 83  nonﬁnancial  ﬁrms  listed  on  the  Santiago  Stock  Market  from  2005  to  2013,  we  ﬁnd  a  dis-
count for  both  business  and  ownership  diversiﬁcation,  which  is  consistent  with  that  reported
for other  economic  or  institutional  settings.  Second,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  business  diversiﬁcation
discount  is  related  to  the  ownership  structure  and  is  due  to  the  excess  of  the  largest  share-
holders’ control  rights.  Third,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation  discount  becomes
a premium  when  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation  enables  the  control  of  the  afﬁliated  ﬁrms.  This
effect can  be  explained  by  the  improvement  of  internal  capital  markets  that  allows  overcoming
the limitations  of  Chilean  external  capital  markets.
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ntroduction
he  allegedly  beneﬁcial  or  detrimental  effects  of  diversiﬁ-
ation  on  the  value  of  the  ﬁrm  have  remained  in  the  core  of
he  business  research  for  long  time  (Tong,  2011).  Recent  lit-
rature  on  corporate  governance  and  ﬁnance  has  underlined
he  effect  of  corporate  ownership,  showing  that  the  cor-
orate  diversiﬁcation  discount  is  more  pronounced  among
rms  with  low  managerial  ownership  and  controlled  by  dom-
nant  shareholders  (Aggarwal  and  Samwick,  2003;  Laeven
nd  Levine,  2007).  Nevertheless,  the  effect  of  pyramidal
wnership  structures,  which  amplify  the  control  of  dominant
hareholders,  is  not  yet  clear.
Using  this  control  enhancing  mechanism,  the  involved
hareholders  can  engage  in  diversiﬁcation  strategies  by
rawing  a  control  chain  that  enable  them  to  achieve  con-
rol  beneﬁts  and  maximize  the  value  of  the  base2 company
f  the  chain  at  the  expense  of  the  minority  shareholders
f  the  subsidiary  ﬁrms  (Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  Faccio  and
ang,  2002;  Laeven  and  Levine,  2008;  Ruiz-Mallorquí  and
antana-Martín,  2009).
The  effect  of  the  ownership  structure  on  the  relation
etween  diversiﬁcation  and  ﬁrm  value  can  be  more  relevant
n  institutional  frameworks  where  the  investor  protection  is
eak  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1998,  1999).  The  previous  research  is
nconclusive  and  has  led  to  a  need  for  researchers  examin-
ng  how  diversiﬁcation  strategy  affects  ﬁrm  performance  in
ifferent  institutional  environments  and  market  conditions
Lodh  et  al.,  2014;  Yigit  and  Behram,  2013).  Prior  studies
ave  focused  on  developed  markets  and  East  Asia  emerg-
ng  countries.  However,  the  literature  on  emerging  South
merican  economies  is  lacking.
We  focus  on  the  Chilean  context  due  to  some  spe-
iﬁc  institutional  features  that  makes  an  interesting  case
nalysis.  These  characteristics  are  substantially  differ-
nt  compared  to  other  developed  countries  and  emerging
conomies  in  which  the  literature  has  shown  the  existence
f  a  diversiﬁcation  discount  (Berger  and  Ofek,  1995;  Campa
nd  Kedia,  2002;  Hoechle  et  al.,  2012;  Lang  and  Stulz,  1994;
ins  and  Servaes,  1999;  Rajan  et  al.,  2000).
First,  Chile  is  an  emerging  economy  with  a  bank-oriented
orporate  system,  where  banks  play  an  important  role  in
omparison  with  the  capital  markets  (Fernández  et  al.,
010;  Fernández,  2005).  Even  the  ﬁrms  belonging  to  eco-
omic  groups  or  holdings,  despite  of  having  developed
nternal  capital  markets,  keep  a  close  long-run  relation  with
he  banks  or  own  a  bank  in  their  economic  groups  (Majluf
t  al.,  1998).  Despite  of  the  small  size  of  the  Chilean  capital
arkets,  compared  with  other  South  American  countries,
hile  presents  a  lower  country-risk  premium,  lower  corrup-
ions  levels,  and  open  ﬁnancial  markets.
Second,  partially  explained  by  the  political  process  at
he  second  half  of  the  80s3 and  as  a  natural  response  of
he  historical  less  enforcement  of  law,  Chilean  ﬁrms  present
 high  ownership  concentration,  primarily  in  the  hands  of
2 Base company is deﬁned as the ﬁrm that invests in the ownership
f other companies.
3 This phenomenon, called ‘‘popular capitalism’’, resulted in the
rivatization of several of the most important ﬁrms in stock mar-
ets.
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ndividual  shareholders  or  well-diversiﬁed  conglomerates,
hat  give  rise  to  pyramidal  structures  (Hachette,  2000;
arraín  and  Vergara,  2000;  Lefort  and  González,  2008;  Lefort
nd  Walker,  2000a,  2000b).  Despite  the  growth  of  the  capital
arkets  in  recent  decades,  the  legal  system  has  not  given
nough  protection  to  the  investors  to  avoid  these  concen-
ration  levels.  On  the  contrary,  the  Chilean  legal  system  has
raditionally  operated  in  a reactive  way  toward  increasing
he  protection  of  existing  pension  systems  administrators
Iglesias,  2000).
Third,  in  order  to  improve  corporate  governance  prac-
ices,  Chilean  regulators  have  recently  adopted  several
apital  markets  rules  as  the  corporate  governance  Law  (Law
0.382,  2009)  and  the  Law  on  transactions  with  related
arties  in  limited  liability  ﬁrms  (Law  18.046,  2010),  to
mprove  the  informational  transparency  about  corporate
overnance.
Our  study  analyzes  the  effect  of  two  types  of  diversiﬁca-
ion  (business  diversiﬁcation  and  ownership  diversiﬁcation)
n  the  market  value  of  the  Chilean  quoted  ﬁrms.  The  busi-
ess  diversiﬁcation  refers  to  the  ﬁrm  segments  in  different
ectors,  and  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation4 refers  to  the  ﬁrm
olding  a  fraction  of  the  ownership  of  other  companies.  For
 sample  of  83  nonﬁnancial  companies  listed  on  the  San-
iago  Stock  Market  from  2005  to  2013,  our  main  result  is
he  evidence  of  a  discount  for  both  business  and  ownership
iversiﬁcation,  which  is  consistent  with  that  reported  for
ther  economic  or  institutional  settings.  Second,  we  ﬁnd
hat  the  business  diversiﬁcation  discount  is  related  to  the
wnership  structure  and  is  due  to  the  excess  of  the  largest
hareholders’  control  rights.  Third,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  owner-
hip  diversiﬁcation  discount  becomes  a  premium  when  the
iversiﬁcation  enhances  the  control  of  other  ﬁrms.  This
ffect  can  be  explained  by  the  improvement  of  internal
apital  markets  that  allow  overcoming  the  limitations  of
xternal  capital  markets.
Our  work  contributes  to  the  ﬁnancial  literature  in  three
ays.  First,  this  study  is  the  ﬁrst  to  analyze  the  impact
f  nonrelated  diversiﬁcation  on  the  value  of  companies  in
n  emerging  South  American  economy.  Second,  our  results
xtend  previous  works  that  have  analyzed  agency  problems
rom  high  concentrated  ownership  structures  and  weaker
aw  investor  protection  (Lefort  and  Urzúa,  2008;  Majluf
t  al.,  2006;  Silva  and  Majluf,  2008).  Finally,  we  use  the
ethod  of  control  chains,  which  allows  to  draw  the  whole
wnership  pyramid  and  to  identify  the  ultimate  sharehol-
ers  of  the  ﬁrms.  Consequently,  we  compute  the  difference
etween  voting  rights  and  control  rights  that  can  result  in
otential  tunneling  problems.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The
econd  section  develops  the  analytical  framework,  which
ncludes  the  literature  review  and  hypotheses  development.
he  third  section  provides  the  description  of  the  study  sam-
le  and  describes  the  method  and  variables  used  in  the
nalysis.  The  fourth  section  presents  the  results.  The  ﬁnal
ection  summarizes  our  main  conclusions.
4 Ownership diversiﬁcation or participation in ownership is deﬁned
s the base ﬁrm participation in the ownership of other compa-
ies, which are either subsidiaries or afﬁliates, in both related and
nrelated industrial segments.
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Analytical framework and hypotheses
Business  diversiﬁcation
Corporate  diversiﬁcation  strategies  are  widely  known  as
having  both  positive  and  negative  implications  for  ﬁrm
efﬁciency.  On  the  one  hand,  tax  beneﬁts  associated  with
diversiﬁcation  can  improve  ﬁrm  value  (Berger  and  Ofek,
1995).  Diversiﬁcation  strategies  also  enable  the  redistri-
bution  of  funds  among  divisions  and  promote  internal
capital  markets  that  can  mitigate  ﬁnancial  constraints  and
improve  efﬁciency  (Campa  and  Kedia,  2002;  Kuppuswamy
and  Villalonga,  2010;  Servaes,  1996).  In  addition,  unrelated
diversiﬁcation  allows  ﬁrms  to  reduce  cash  ﬂow  volatil-
ity  and  corporate  risk  (Hann  et  al.,  2013;  Kuppuswamy
and  Villalonga,  2010;  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1992).  In  sum,
the  diversiﬁcation  may  allow  ﬁrms  to  invest  in  marginally
proﬁtable  projects  (Fluck  and  Lynch,  1999),  to  trans-
fer  knowledge  among  business  units  (Becerra,  2009;
Humphery-Jenner,  2010),  to  implement  some  organizational
improvements  (Matsusaka,  2001),  and  to  take  advantage  of
potential  generation  of  synergies  and  economies  of  scope
(Becerra,  2009;  Gomes  and  Livdan,  2004;  Lang  and  Stulz,
1994).
On  the  other  hand,  a  diversiﬁcation  discount  may  arise
if  diversiﬁcation  strategies  lead  to  discretionary  behavior
by  ﬁrm’s  managers  and  controlling  shareholders.  This  dis-
count  can  be  explained  by  inefﬁcient  resources  allocation
from  more  productive  segments  to  poorer  ones  (Aivazian
et  al.,  2011;  Berger  and  Ofek,  1995;  Servaes,  1996),  overin-
vestment  in  business  segments  that  have  lower  investment
opportunities  (Campa  and  Kedia,  2002),  and  the  organiza-
tional  complexity  that  can  cause  operational  inefﬁciencies
(Klein  and  Lein,  2009;  Klein  and  Saidenberg,  2010).  Thus,
diversiﬁcation  strategies  may  exacerbate  the  so-called  dark
side  of  internal  capital  markets  and  the  inefﬁcient  resource
(Baker,  1992;  Hoechle  et  al.,  2012;  Ozbas  and  Scharfstein,
2010).
Reﬂecting  such  theoretical  disparities,  literature  has  not
yet  arrived  to  a  conclusive  argument  for  the  existence  of  a
diversiﬁcation  discount  (Lamont  and  Polk,  2002;  Lang  and
Stulz,  1994;  Rajan  et  al.,  2000;  Whited,  2001).  Whether  a
diversiﬁcation  discount  occurs  and  whether  the  reason  for
the  discount  is  related  to  agency  problems  or  lies  in  the
organizational  structure  of  the  ﬁrm  is  an  issue  that  is  still
under  debate  (Jiraporn  et  al.,  2008).
These  arguments  apply  especially  in  emerging
economies.  Purkayastha  et  al.  (2012)  build  on  three  theo-
retical  lenses  to  explain  the  speciﬁc  relations  between  ﬁrm
diversiﬁcation  and  performance  in  developing  countries.
The  ﬁrst  reason  stems  from  the  institutional  view  and  is
based  on  the  fact  that  the  costs  and  beneﬁts  of  diver-
siﬁcation  can  be  different  due  to  more  severe  market
imperfections  in  such  scenarios  (Khanna  and  Palepu,  2000;
Lins  and  Servaes,  2002).  To  cope  effectively  with  a  less
efﬁcient  institutional  environment,  companies  may  wish
to  pursue  unrelated  diversiﬁcation  strategy  as  an  effective
means  of  gaining  self-generated  institutional  support
(Chakrabarti  et  al.,  2007;  Yigit  and  Behram,  2013).  Second,
from  the  resource-view  perspective,  in  the  relevant  factors
for  ﬁrm  performance  in  emerging  markets  are  not  only
competencies  and  technological  abilities  but  also  resources
d
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uch  as  political  and  bureaucratic  contacts  and  connections
Kock  and  Guillén,  2001;  Purkayastha  et  al.,  2012).  Corpo-
ate  diversiﬁcation  across  a  wide  range  of  businesses  could
e  the  consequence  of  leveraging  bureaucratic  connections
cross  diverse  industries.  Third,  the  ﬁnance  perspective
nderlines  the  different  transaction  and  agency  costs  in
ess  developed  countries.  Thus,  corporate  diversiﬁcation
hrough  the  internalization  of  a  range  of  products  and
ervices  can  be  the  outcome  of  the  different  type  of
rominent  agency  problems  in  these  countries  (Chung,
004;  Garrido  et  al.,  2014).
The  above  exposed  arguments  do  not  point  at  an  unequiv-
cal  relation  between  diversiﬁcation  and  ﬁrm  performance
n  emerging  countries.  Higher  asymmetric  information  might
llow  management  to  more  easily  run  the  ﬁrm  for  their
wn  purposes.  In  addition,  conﬂicts  of  interests  between
arge  shareholders  who  also  manage  the  business  groups,
nd  the  minority  shareholders  of  the  afﬁliated  ﬁrms  are
ikely  to  arise  in  these  countries  (Huyghebaert  and  Wang,
012;  Yao  et  al.,  2010).  As  suggested  by  Yigit  and  Behram
2013)  these  agency  problems  can  be  exacerbated  when
hareholders  rights  are  not  well  protected,  the  contract
nforcement  is  difﬁcult,  and  accounting  standards  are
oor.
The  empirical  evidence  on  the  existence  of  a  diversiﬁca-
ion  discount  in  emerging  markets  mirrors  such  a fragmented
heoretical  background.  On  the  one  hand,  some  studies
eport  that  diversiﬁcation  destroys  ﬁrm  value  in  emerg-
ng  economies  (Chen  and  Kim,  2000;  Lins  and  Servaes,
002).  On  the  other  hand,  Claessens  et  al.  (1999)  and
hanna  and  Palepu  (2000)  show  that  diversiﬁcation  strate-
ies  add  value  in  India  and  East  Asia  as  a  way  to  overcome
nstitutional  and  market  imperfections.  However,  recent
vidence  casts  some  doubts  on  the  robustness  of  these  stud-
es  (Lensink  and  van-der-Molen,  2010).  Furthermore,  the
esearch  on  diversiﬁcation  in  emerging  markets  has  focused
n  Asia  and  very  little  is  known  about  the  emerging  mar-
ets  of  South  America  (Farías,  2014;  Khanna  and  Palepu,
000;  Lensink  and  van-der-Molen,  2010;  Lins  and  Servaes,
002).
Thus,  the  effect  of  the  diversiﬁcation  discount  on  Chilean
ompanies  is  an  empirical  question,  and  we  state  our  ﬁrst
ypothesis  is  stated  as  follows:
ypothesis  1a.  In  Chilean  ﬁrms  there  is  a  discount  for
nrelated  diversiﬁcation  strategies.
ypothesis  1b.  In  Chilean  ﬁrms  there  is  a  premium  for
nrelated  diversiﬁcation  strategies.
wnership  diversiﬁcation
lthough  both  business  diversiﬁcation  and  ownership  diver-
iﬁcation  are  corporate  diversiﬁcation  strategies,  we  posit
hat  the  ownership  structure  of  business  conglomerates
s  such  a  relevant  issue  that  requires  an  in-depth  atten-
ion.  In  fact,  a  number  of  studies  relate  the  diversiﬁcation
iscount  to  the  ownership  structure  and  the  large  share-
olders  incentives  to  engage  in  private  beneﬁts  seeking
ctivities  (Jensen,  1986;  Morck  et  al.,  1990).  Delios  and  Wu
2005)  ﬁnd  that  the  effect  of  business  diversiﬁcation  in  an
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merging  market  is  related  to  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation
oo.
Most  of  the  literature  on  corporate  ownership  struc-
ure  and  ﬁrm  diversiﬁcation  is  concerned  with  managerial
wnership,  whereas  considerably  less  research  has  inves-
igated  the  set  of  relations  among  outside  shareholders,
iversiﬁcation,  and  ﬁrm  performance  in  emerging  countries
Chen  and  Yu,  2012).  The  evidence  from  Singapore  reported
y  Chen  and  Ho  (2000)  shows  that,  while  outside  blockhold-
rs  may  act  as  a  deterrent  on  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation,
utside  block  ownership  does  not  have  a  signiﬁcant  impact
n  the  value  of  diversiﬁcation.
Ownership  pyramidal  structures  are  one  of  the  most
ommonly  used  mechanisms  to  achieve  this  excess  of  con-
rol  rights  over  cash  ﬂow  rights  in  emerging  countries
Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999;  Lins,  2003).  The
idespread  use  of  ownership  pyramids  contrasts  with  the
nsufﬁcient  research  on  how  and  whether  pyramidal  owner-
hip  inﬂuences  diversiﬁcation  decisions  (Chung,  2013).  The
heoretical  arguments  on  this  impact  are  twofold  so  the
yramidal  ownership  structure  that  enhances  the  separa-
ion  between  cash  ﬂow  rights  and  voting  rights  can  result
n  tunneling  and  propping  (Cheung  et  al.,  2006).  While  tun-
eling  refers  to  a  transfer  of  resources  from  a  lower-level
rm  to  a  higher-level  ﬁrm  in  the  pyramidal  chain,  prop-
ing  is  the  transfer  in  the  opposite  direction  to  bail  out
he  receiving  ﬁrm  from  bankruptcy  (Riyanto  and  Toolsema,
008).  Friedman  et  al.  (2003)  show  that  in  countries  with
eak  legal  systems,  under  some  conditions  entrepreneurs
an  undertake  both  activities.
The  literature  has  shown  that  controlling  shareholders
an  have  incentives  to  extract  private  beneﬁts  from  the
rms  they  control  at  the  expense  of  minority  sharehol-
ers  (David  et  al.,  2010;  Ruiz-Mallorquí  and  Santana-Martín,
011).  Consistent  with  this  view,  diversiﬁcation  can  be
een  as  an  outcome  of  the  incentives  of  controlling  share-
olders  in  relation  with  other  shareholders.  Nevertheless,
wnership  diversiﬁcation  can  have  positive  effects  on  minor-
ty  shareholders  wealth  since  they  may  be  willing  to  be
xpropriated  in  exchange  for  implicit  insurance  against
ankruptcy  (Riyanto  and  Toolsema,  2008).Chile  is  an  interesting  case  to  test  the  effect  of  this
ontrol-enhancing  mechanism  on  the  value  of  diversiﬁca-
ion  since  Chilean  business  groups  are  characterized  by
yramidal  ownership  structures  (Lefort  and  Walker,  2000b).
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Table  1  Sample  composition  by  year-sector.
2005  2006  2007  2008  
Basic  materials  3  (29)  7  (29)  18  (29)  18  (29)  
Consumer cyclicals  1  (26)  1  (26)  6  (26)  6  (26)  
Consumer non-cyclicals  9  (35)  14  (35)  20  (35)  19  (35)  
Energy 1  (5)  1  (5)  2  (5)  1  (5)  
Healthcare 1  (4)  2  (4)  2  (4)  3  (4)  
Industrials 3  (30)  10  (30)  18  (30)  17  (30)  
Technology 1  (4)  1  (4)  1  (4)  
Telecommunications  2  (4)  3  (4)  3  (4)  3  (4)  
Utilities 8  (26)  10  (26)  13  (26)  13  (26)  
Total 28  (159)  49  (163)  83  (163)  81  (163)  M.  Jara-Bertin  et  al.
ue  to  the  weaker  legal  protection  of  investors  and  credi-
ors,  Chilean  companies  have  experienced  a  high  degree  of
wnership  concentration  over  the  last  twenty  years,  mainly
n  the  hands  of  individual  shareholders  or  well-diversiﬁed
usiness  groups  (Demirgüc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic,  2002;
spinosa,  2009;  Lefort  and  González,  2008).  This  concen-
rated  ownership  has  given  rise  to  pyramid  structures  as  a
ommon  mean  for  the  separation  between  voting  rights  and
ash  ﬂow  rights.  The  data  reported  by  Lefort  and  Walker
2000b,  2007)  and  Majluf  et  al.  (1998)  show  that  approxi-
ately  68%  of  nonﬁnancial  companies  listed  on  the  Santiago
tock  Market  are  controlled  by  an  economic  group,  and  that
yramidal  structures  are  used  in  about  one-third  of  the  listed
ompanies.
Coherently  with  the  theoretical  twofold  arguments,  we
tate  our  second  hypothesis  in  a  dual  way  too:
ypothesis  2a.  In  Chilean  ﬁrms  there  is  a  discount  for
wnership  diversiﬁcation.
ypothesis  2b.  In  Chilean  ﬁrms  there  is  a  premium  for
wnership  diversiﬁcation.
ample, variables and method
ample
he  sample  includes  83  nonﬁnancial  Chilean  companies
isted  on  the  Santiago  Stock  Exchange  between  2005  and
013,  totaling  622  ﬁrm-year  observations.  We  draw  our
ample  from  two  main  information  sources.  We  obtain
ata  from  ﬁnancial  statements  (balance  sheet  and  income
nd  expenditures  statement)  and  the  market  value  of  the
rms  from  the  Datastream  database.  The  information  on
he  ownership  structure  and  both  unrelated  diversiﬁca-
ion  and  ownership  participation  of  other  companies  comes
rom  a hand-collected  process  from  several  information
ources  (the  ﬁrms  annual  reports  and  the  Superintenden-
ia  de  Valores  y  Seguros  reports,  among  others).  This
ast  information  is  the  most  restrictive  in  terms  of  limit-
ng  the  size  of  our  sample.  Thus,  because  our  dependent
‘excess  value’’  variable  is  estimated  with  ‘‘imputed  val-
es’’,  to  deal  with  this  problem  we  use  an  auxiliary
ample  composed  of  163  nonﬁnancial  ﬁrms  and  1463
2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  Total
17  (29)  15  (29)  17  (29)  14  (29)  12  (29)  121  (261)
6  (26)  7  (26)  8  (26)  8  (26)  3  (26)  46  (234)
21  (35)  20  (35)  19  (35)  20  (35)  11  (35)  153  (315)
1  (5)  1  (5)  1  (5)  2  (5)  1  (5)  11  (45)
3  (4)  3  (4)  4  (4)  3  (4)  4  (4)  25  (36)
17  (30)  18  (30)  17  (30)  17  (30)  10  (30)  127  (270)
1  (4)  1  (4)  1  (4)  1  (4)  1  (4)  8  (32)
2  (4)  2  (4)  2  (4)  2  (4)  3  (4)  22  (36)
13  (26)  13  (26)  13  (26)  14  (26)  12  (26)  109  (234)
81  (163)  80  (163)  82  (163)  81  (163)  57  (163)  622  (1463)
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observations  for  the  2005--2013  period.  Table  1  provides
a  detailed  description  of  the  sample  (auxiliary  sample)
including  the  number  of  ﬁrms  and  observations  by  year-
industry.
Since  we  are  interested  in  the  effects  of  diversiﬁcation
on  the  ﬁrm  market  value,  both  the  base  ﬁrms  and  the  aux-
iliary  sample  are  traded  ﬁrms.  On  the  contrary,  the  ﬁrms
controlled  by  the  base  ﬁrms  are  not  necessary  traded.  In
the  cases  in  which  the  ﬁrms  are  listed,  the  effect  of  the
diversiﬁcation  on  the  value  of  the  ﬁrm  could  be  affected  by
the  valuation  of  the  shareholders  of  the  target  ﬁrm.  To  con-
trol  for  this  issue,  we  include  as  explanatory  variables  a  set
of  factors  related  to  how  the  control  of  the  target  ﬁrms  is
implemented.
Variables
Excess  value  and  value  measures
To  compute  the  existence  of  a  diversiﬁcation  discount  we
use  the  measure  of  excess  value  proposed  by  Berger  and
Ofek  (1995),  who  compare  the  total  value  of  the  company
to  the  sum  of  the  imputed  values  that  are  assigned  to  each
segment  as  if  each  one  is  an  individual  single-segment  com-
pany.  Thus,  the  excess  value  for  a  company  is  determined
by
Exvalxi,t =  Log
(
MVi,t
Imputed  Valuei,t
)
(1)
Imputed  Valuei,t =
∑
(SAsseti,t ∗  Multiplier), (2)
where  Exvalxi,t is  the  excess  value  for  ﬁrm  i  in  year  t;  MVi,t
is  the  ﬁrm’s  market  capitalization  (market  value  of  com-
mon  equity  plus  book  value  of  debt)  for  ﬁrm  i in  year  t;
and  Imputed  Value  is  the  sum  of  the  product  of  segment
asset  (or  sales),  SAsset,  and  the  asset  (or  sales)  multiplier.
Multiplier  is  measured  as  the  median  total  market  capi-
talization  to  asset  (or  sales)  for  the  single-segment  ﬁrms
in  the  same  industry  in  the  same  year.  A  positive  excess
value  indicates  that  the  ﬁrm  is  worth  more  than  the  sum
of  its  segments  whereas  a  negative  excess  value  implies
that  the  ﬁrm  as  a  whole  is  worth  less  than  the  sum  of  its
segments.  Thus,  a  positive  excess  value  implies  a  diversiﬁ-
cation  premium  whereas  a  negative  excess  value  indicates
a  diversiﬁcation  discount.  When  we  use  multiple  assets
(multiple  sales),  the  resulting  excess  value  is  EXVALASSETS
(EXVALSALES).
To  check  the  robustness  of  our  results  with  owner-
ship  diversiﬁcation,  we  estimate  Eq.  (4)  incorporating  as  a
dependent  variable  the  market-to-book  ratio  as  a  measure
of  ﬁrm’s  value  (Adam  and  Goyal,  2008).
Diversiﬁcation  measures
We  analyze  the  diversiﬁcation  along  two  lines:  unrelated
business  diversiﬁcation  and  ownership  diversiﬁcation.  To
measure  unrelated  diversiﬁcation,  we  use  the  Herﬁnd-
ahl  index  modiﬁed  by  Berry  (1971),  which  reﬂects  the
absence  of  concentration  of  sales  (HERFSALES)  and  assets
(HERFASSETS).  The  higher  this  variable,  the  higher  the
level  of  corporate  diversiﬁcation  of  the  company,  either
in  sales  or  assets.  Since  this  index  has  been  criticized
because  of  its  sensitivity  to  market  price  volatility,  we
r
v
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lso  include  a  measure  of  entropy  of  assets  (ENTROASSETS)
nd  sales  (ENTROSALES),  which  considers  diversiﬁcation
cross  different  levels  of  industry  aggregation.  The  entropy
ariables  are  positively  related  to  the  degree  of  diversiﬁca-
ion.
As  a  complement,  we  also  employ  a  number  of  alternative
easures.  We  deﬁne  DIV,  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  1
hen  the  company  is  diversiﬁed  into  unrelated  sectors,  and
ero  otherwise.  NSEC  is  the  number  of  industry  segments  in
hich  the  company  participates.
The  measure  of  ownership  diversiﬁcation  and  control
ver  other  ﬁrms  is  based  on  the  number  of  ﬁrms  in  whose
wnership  the  base  ﬁrms  have  a  stake  (NPART).  We  deﬁne
CONTR  as  the  proportion  of  companies  that  are  subsidiaries
ver  the  total  number  of  companies  in  which  the  company
wns  some  share.  CERPT  is  the  number  of  subsidiaries  in
elated  sectors  over  the  total  number  of  companies  in  which
he  base  ﬁrm  owns  a fraction  of  shares.  We  include  LNCAP-
NV,  deﬁned  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  total  capital
nvested  in  other  companies.  In  addition,  we  incorporate  the
IVINV  dummy  variable,  which  takes  the  value  1  when  the
nvestment  portfolio  in  the  ownership  of  other  companies  is
iversiﬁed,  and  zero  otherwise.
We  follow  La  Porta  et  al.  (1999)  and  Santana  and
guiar  (2006)  approach  and  use  the  control  chain  method-
logy,  which  allows  us  to  identify  a  ﬁrm’s  ultimate  owner,
hat  is,  the  shareholder  who  effectively  controls  the  ﬁrm.
ccording  to  this  procedure,  we  compute  the  separa-
ion  between  the  ultimate  shareholder’s  voting  rights  and
ash  ﬂow  rights  (DVDFC).  Additionally,  we  introduce  two
ummy  variables  (SEP1/SEP2)  that  take  value  1  when  the
eparation  between  voting  rights  and  cash  ﬂow  rights  is
igher/lower  than  the  mean  of  DVDFC,  and  zero  other-
ise.
ontrol  variables
ollowing  prior  literature,  we  introduce  into  our  model  a
umber  of  ﬁrm-level  control  variables  that  potentially  affect
he  value  of  a  diversiﬁed  ﬁrm.  We  control  for  the  ﬁrm  size
LNTA),  measured  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets;
he  ﬁnancial  leverage  (DTTA),  measured  as  the  ratio  of  total
ebt  to  total  assets;  the  proﬁtability  (EBITSAL),  calculated
s  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes  over  sales;  and  the
rowth  opportunities  proxied  by  capital  expenditures  over
ales  (CAPEXSAL).
We  also  control  for  some  characteristics  of  the  Chilean
orporate  system.  Chile  has  a  French  civil  law  institutional
etting  with  weaker  external  investor  protection  than  the
nglo-Saxon  countries.  The  corporate  ownership  is  usually
oncentrated  in  the  hands  of  few  controlling  shareholders.
ith  this  in  mind,  we  introduce  the  control  variable  DFC1,
eﬁned  as  the  percentage  of  cash  ﬂow  rights  held  by  the
ltimate  shareholder.  We  control  for  a  possible  subprime
risis  effect  with  the  CRISIS  dummy  variable,  which  equals
 for  2008  and  2009,  and  zero  otherwise.  In  addition,  we
ntroduce  a  set  of  nine  industry  dummy  variables  according
o  the  sector  classiﬁcation  provided  by  the  Chilean  Secu-
ity  Exchange  Regulator  (DSEC)  and  a  set  of  year  dummy
ariables  (DYEAR).
See  the  Appendix  for  complete  deﬁnitions  of  all  varia-
les.
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ethod
o  test  the  effect  of  the  corporate  diversiﬁcation  and  the
wnership  diversiﬁcation  on  the  value  of  the  ﬁrms,  we  esti-
ate  the  following  models:
xvalxit =  ˇ0 +  (ˇ1 +  ˛1 ·  DVDFC) ·  Diversiﬁcation  Measureit
+  ˇ2 ·  DIVit +  ˇ3 ·  DVDFCit +  ˇ4 · DFC1
+  ˇ3 ·  CAPEXSALit +  ˇ4 ·  LNTAit +  ˇ5 · DTTAit
+  ˇ6 ·  EBITSALit +  ˇ8 ·  DESCit +  ˇ9 ·  DYEARit +  εit
(3)
xvalxit or  MTBit =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1 ·  NPARTit +  (ˇ2 +  ˛1 ·  SEP1
+  ˛2 ·  SEP2)  ·  Own.  div.  measureit
+  ˇ3 ·  SEP1it +  ˇ4 ·  SEP2it
+  ˇ5 ·  DIVINVit +  ˇ6 ·  DFC1it
t
D
a
Table  2  Descriptive  statistics.
Variables  Mean  Sta
Panel  A
EXVALSALES  −0.020  0.1
EXVALASSETS 0.059  0.1
MTB 1.795  1.8
HERFSALES  0.178  0.2
ENTROSALES  0.321  0.4
HERFASSETS 0.260  0.3
ENTROASSETS  0.270 0.4
NSEC 2.061 1.4
DIV 0.542 0.4
NPART 5.757 4.2
PCONTR 0.667 0.3
CERTP 0.405  0.3
LNCAPINV 15.872  7.0
DIVINV 0.725  0.4
DVDFC 0.082  0.1
DFC1 0.399  0.2
DV1 0.481  0.2
SEP1 0.232  0.4
SEP2 0.227  0.4
CAPEXSAL 0.118  0.1
LNTA 19.628  1.7
DTTA 0.237  0.1
EBITSAL 0.136  0.1
CRISIS 0.260  0.4
PNDIV 0.504  0.2
PSDIV 0.703  0.2
CRECGDP 0.042  0.0
Panel B
Corporation  0.683  0.4
Holding company  0.098  0.2
Individual investor  0.152  0.3
Institutional  investor  0.065  0.2
Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maxim
proportion of ﬁrms according to the identity of the controlling sharehoM.  Jara-Bertin  et  al.
+  ˇ7 ·  LNCAPINVit +  ˇ8 ·  CAPEXSALit
+  ˇ9 · LNTAit +  ˇ10 · DTTAit
+  ˇ11 ·  EBITSALit +  ˇ12 · DSECit
+  ˇ13 ·  DYEARit +  εit (4)
A  large  body  of  literature  highlights  the  existence  of
ndogenous  selection  problems  in  diversiﬁcation  and  perfor-
ance  models  (Miller,  2006;  Villalonga,  2004).  These  authors
laim  that  ﬁrms  decide  their  diversiﬁcation  strategy  as  a
esponse  to  exogenous  changes  in  the  ﬁrm  environment.
ue  to  these  methodological  failures,  the  diversiﬁcation  dis-
ount  can  stem  from  omitting  the  potential  endogeneity  of
he  diversiﬁcation  strategy.  Indeed,  Campa  and  Kedia  (2002)
nd  that  the  diversiﬁcation  discount  is  alleviated,  and  some-
imes  even  disappears,  after  controlling  for  endogeneity.
When  we  accept  the  possible  endogeneity  in  our  models,
IV  and  DIVINV  are  correlated  with  the  error  term  in  Eqs.  (3)
nd  (4), respectively.  As  a  result,  the  estimated  coefﬁcients
nd.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
21  −0.435  0.306
39  −0.489  0.800
79  0.1  14.3
33  0  0.832
23  0  1.842
57  0  1
50  0  1.731
28 1  10
99  0  1
95 0  22
81 0  1
50  0  1
89  0  27.196
46  0  1
48  0  0.779
49  0.005  0.998
48  0.005  0.998
22  0  1
19  0  1
28  0  1.427
22  14.786  23.980
32  0  0.627
69  −0.453  0.940
39  0  1
02  0  1
25  0  1
22  −0.01  0.058
65  0  1
97  0  1
60  0  1
48  0  1
um of each variable for the total sample. Panel B reports the
lder.
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ˇ2 may  be  biased  because  of  endogenous  selection  problems
in  the  model.  We  address  this  issue  by  using  the  Heckman
(1979)  method.
The  two-step  Heckman’s  procedure  explicitly  captures
both  ﬁrm-speciﬁc  and  macroeconomic  factors  that  inﬂuence
the  ﬁrm  propensity  to  diversiﬁcation  (Dastidar,  2009).  In
the  ﬁrst  stage,  we  estimate  the  selection  equation  (5)  as
a  maximum-likelihood  probit  model  to  analyze  the  propen-
sity  to  diversify,  and  we  calculate  the  Mills  inverse  ratio  (i).
In  the  second  stage  we  introduce  the  Mills  inverse  ratio  as
an  additional  explanatory  variable  in  Eqs.  (3)  and  (4).
According  to  Campa  and  Kedia  (2002),  the  probit  model
for  the  ﬁrst  stage  can  be  deﬁned  as  follows:
DIV∗it or  DIVINV
∗
it =  F(1 ·  DVDFCit +  2 ·  DFC1it
+3 ·  LNTAit +  4 ·  DTTAit +  5 ·  EBITSALit
+7 ·  CAPEXSALit +  8 ·  CRECGDPit
+9 ·  PNDIVit +  10 ·  PSDIVit)  (5)
DIVit(or  DIVINVit)  =  1  si  DIV∗it(o  DIVINV∗it)  >  0
DIVit(or  DIVINVit)  =  0  si  DIV∗it(o  DIVINV∗it)  <  0,
where  DIV∗it and  DIVINV
∗
it are  two  unobservable  latent  varia-
bles.  The  variables  potentially  affecting  the  diversiﬁcation
decision  are  both  ﬁrm-level  factors  (size,  proﬁtability,
growth  opportunities,  and  largest  shareholder’s  stake  in
ownership)  and  country-level  macroeconomic  factors  such
as  the  GDP  growth  rate  for  the  period  (CRECGDPit).  In  this
selection  equation  we  also  include  two  factors  related  to
the  industry:  PNDIVit is  the  percentage  of  companies  from
the  primary  industry  that  are  diversiﬁed,  and  PSDIVit is  the
proportion  of  sales  of  the  diversiﬁed  companies.
i
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Table  3  Mean  comparisons  according  to  diversiﬁed  vs.  undiversiﬁ
Diversiﬁed  
Mean  S.D.  
Panel  A:  description  for  sales  diversiﬁcation
EXVALSALES  0.053  0.128  
EXVALASSETS  −0.040  0.124  
MTB  1.525  1.043  
DVDFC  0.071  0.126  
Total  obs.  337  
Panel B:  description  for  ownership  diversiﬁcation
EXVALSALES  0.050  0.122  
EXVALASSETS  −0.030  0.116  
MTB  1.552  1.124  
DVDFC  0.088  0.158  
Total  obs.  391  
Mean and standard deviation. Panel A provides the means comparison a
comparison according to the ownership diversiﬁcation.
* A level of signiﬁcance of less than 10%.
** A level of signiﬁcance of less than 5%.
*** A level of signiﬁcance of less than 1%.265
esults
escriptive  analysis
able  2  shows  the  main  descriptive  statistics  of  our  sam-
le.  Regarding  diversiﬁcation  measures  (Panel  A  of  Table  2),
pproximately  54.2%  of  the  companies  are  diversiﬁed  in
erms  of  holding  more  than  one  industrial  segment  (DIV).
his  number  is  higher  than  the  results  reported  by  Lins
nd  Servaes  (1999)  for  developed  economies  (United  States,
6%;  Germany,  37%;  Japan,  41%;  United  Kingdom,  38%).
roadly  speaking,  the  number  of  sectors  (NSEC)  in  which
rms  are  diversiﬁed  is  low,  with  an  average  value  of  2.06
ectors,  and  therefore  the  degree  of  absence  of  concen-
ration  in  sales  and  assets  (HERFSALES  and  HERFASSETS)  is
igniﬁcantly  reduced.  DIVINV  informs  that  72.5%  of  com-
anies  are  diversiﬁed  in  terms  of  ownership,  participating
n  average  in  the  ownership  of  5.75  companies  (NPART).
he  base  ﬁrms  control  the  afﬁliated  ﬁrms  in  66.7%  of  cases
PCONTR)  but  only  in  40.5%  of  cases  from  related  industry
egments  (CERTP).  In  general,  these  results  show  that  com-
anies  tend  to  diversify  their  ownership  of  other  companies
o  form  conglomerates  and  that  the  degree  of  control  over
hese  companies  is  essential.  These  conglomerates  have  low
ndustrial  diversiﬁcation  in  most  cases.  Additionally,  pyrami-
al  ownership  structures  enhance  the  separation  of  voting
ights  and  cash  ﬂow  rights,  with  voting  rights  exceeding  cash
ow  rights  by  8.2%  on  average  (DVDFC).
Panel  B  of  Table  2  provides  some  information  on  the
wnership  structure  of  the  ﬁrms  in  our  sample.  We  report  the
roportion  of  ﬁrms  whose  controlling  shareholder  is  another
on-ﬁnancial  corporation,  a  holding  company,  an  individual
nvestor,  or  an  institutional  investor.  These  data  underlines
he  important  role  of  corporations  (68.3%  of  ﬁrms  are  con-
rolled  by  another  non-ﬁnancial  ﬁrm)  and  the  need  to  control
or  pyramid  ownership  structures.
ed  criteria.
Non-diversiﬁed  Mean  difference
Mean  S.D.  t-Statistic
0.653  0.149  −1.06
0.003  0.111  −4.55***
2.112  2.498  −3.923***
0.093  0.169  −1.859*
285
0.072  0.162  −1.87*
−0.002  0.126  −2.81***
2.203  2.668  −4.23***
0.059  0.101  2.00**
231
ccording to the sales diversiﬁcation. Panel B provides the means
2 M.  Jara-Bertin  et  al.
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Table  4  Probit  estimation.
(1)  DIV  (2)DIVINV
Intercept  −1.5.975*** −1.054
[−4.07] [−0.59]
Firm-level  factors
DFC1  −0.533** 0.512*
[−2.13]  [1.82]
DVDFC −1.207*** 0.534*
[−3.01]  [1.85]
LNTA 0.253*** 0.174***
[7.26]  [3.55]
DTTA 0.260  −2.017**
[0.54]  [−2.40]
EBITSAL  −0.028  −2.611***
[−1.08]  [−5.43]
CAPEXSAL  −0.020  6.73***
[−1.05]  [2.64]
Industry-level  factors
PNDIV  2.329*** −0.691*
[5.04]  [−1.75]
PSDIV  0.576* 0.055*
[1.88]  [1.86]
Macroeconomic  factors
CRECGDP  −2.253  −4.845
[−0.95]  [−1.42]
No. obs.  622  622
Log likelihood  −144.58  −171.55
LR chi2 (17)  69.04*** 42.14***
Pseudo  R2 0.  2087  0.1928
Estimated coefﬁcients [z-statistic] of the probit estimates of Eq.
(5) (ﬁrst stage of the Heckman procedure). The dependent varia-
bles are unrelated diversiﬁcation (DIV) and the diversiﬁcation in
investment (DIVINV).
* A level of signiﬁcance lower than 10%.
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Table  3  reports  some  descriptive  statistics  along  with  the
esults  of  the  test  of  means  comparison.  Panel  A  in  Table  3
eports  the  mean  (standard  deviation)  of  the  variables  after
plitting  the  sample  according  to  the  corporate  diversiﬁ-
ation  criteria  (DIV).  We  also  report  the  t-test  for  means
omparison  across  sub-samples.  Panel  B  provides  analogous
tatistics  when  the  sample  is  divided  according  to  the  owner-
hip  of  other  companies  (DIVINV).
Panel  A  of  Table  3  shows  that  business  diversiﬁed  com-
anies  have  a  lower  value  in  assets  and  sales,  which  is
n  line  with  arguments  supporting  the  existence  of  a  dis-
ount  for  diversiﬁcation.  Thus,  not  surprisingly,  they  have
igher  values  for  lack  of  concentration  in  the  investment
ortfolio  in  other  companies.  According  to  Panel  B  of
able  3  the  diversiﬁcation  discount  also  holds  for  ownership
iversiﬁed  ﬁrms.  Interestingly,  the  excess  of  voting  rights
ver  cash  ﬂow  rights  is  signiﬁcantly  higher  for  ownership
iversiﬁed  ﬁrms.  This  result  can  be  induced  by  the  large
hareholders’  incentives  to  take  stakes  in  the  ownership
f  other  companies  and  to  build  pyramidal  control  struc-
ures  to  achieve  private  control  beneﬁts  (Claessens  et  al.,
000).
xplanatory  analysis
stimating  the  selection  equations:  probit  estimates
n  the  ﬁrst  stage  of  our  analysis,  we  run  a  probit  estimation  of
he  selection  equation  (5),  which  analyzes  the  propensity  of
ompanies  to  establish  unrelated  corporate  diversiﬁcation
trategies  and  to  diversify  into  the  ownership  of  other  com-
anies.  We  posit  that  the  ﬁrm  diversiﬁcation  is  affected  both
y  ﬁrm-level  factors,  industry-level  factors,  and  macroeco-
omic  factors.
Table  4  reports  the  estimates  of  the  selection  models.
n  Column  1  the  dependent  variable  is  the  unrelated  cor-
orate  diversiﬁcation  decision  (DIV),  and  in  Column  2  the
ependent  variable  is  the  decision  to  diversify  the  invest-
ent  portfolio  of  ownership  of  other  companies  (DIVINV).
The  goodness  of  ﬁt  (proxied  by  the  pseudo-R2 coefﬁcient)
s  0.2087  and  0.1928,  respectively.  As  expected,  larger  ﬁrms
ave  a  greater  propensity  to  diversify  into  different  produc-
ive  segments  and  other  companies.  The  cash  ﬂow  rights
f  the  main  shareholder  (DFC1)  have  a  negative  effect  on
he  propensity  to  engage  in  unrelated  diversiﬁcation  but
 positive  effect  on  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation,  which
s  in  line  with  the  argument  that  when  controlling  share-
olders  participate  more  in  the  ownership,  then  they  will
ave  more  incentives  to  take  decisions  efﬁciently  in  order
o  improve  the  performance  of  the  core  segments  of  the
rms.
As  far  as  the  industry-level  variables  are  concerned,
SDIV  has  a  consistent  positive  effect  on  both  types  of  diver-
iﬁcation.  This  result,  coherent  with  Santalo  and  Becerra
2008),  means  that  the  more  companies  are  diversiﬁed  in
he  base  industry,  the  higher  the  corporate  propensity  to
iversify.  In  other  words,  the  diversiﬁcation  may  confer  com-
etitive  advantages  in  industries  in  which  diversiﬁed  ﬁrms
ave  a  large  fraction  of  the  market  shares.  Similarly,  in  line
ith  Campa  and  Kedia  (2002),  our  macroeconomic  condi-
ion  variable  lacks  of  statistical  signiﬁcance  on  both  types
f  diversiﬁcation.
d
3
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a** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 5%.
*** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 1%.
odels  estimation
ables  5  and  6  report  the  results  of  the  estimation  of  Eq.  (3),
hich  analyzes  the  effect  of  the  unrelated  business  diver-
iﬁcation  strategies  and  pyramidal  ownership  structure  on
rm  value.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  estimated  excess
alue  based  on  sales  multiples  (EXVALSALES)  in  Table  5,
nd  the  estimated  excess  value  based  on  asset  multiples
EXVALASSETS)  in  Table  6.  The  goodness  of  ﬁt  is  assessed
hrough  the  Wald-X2 test  of  joint  signiﬁcance  of  the  esti-
ated  coefﬁcients.  It  can  be  seen  that  this  test  is  always
ighly  signiﬁcant  in  all  the  estimates.
Column  1  of  Tables  5  and  6  show  a  clear  negative  rela-
ion  between  the  degree  of  diversiﬁcation  both  in  sales  and
n  assets  (HERFSALES  and  HERFASSETS)  and  the  measure  of
xcess  value,  be  it  estimated  either  by  sales  or  by  assets  mul-
iples  (EXVALSALES  and  EXVALASSETS).  These  results  conﬁrm
ur  hypothesis  H1a, according  to  which  there  is  a  business
iversiﬁcation  discount  in  Chilean  ﬁrms.  In  Columns  2  and
 we  provide  further  arguments  to  explain  this  diversiﬁ-
ation  discount.  As  shown,  when  diversiﬁcation  measures
re  interacted  with  the  separation  of  voting  rights  and  cash
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Table  5  Business  diversiﬁcation,  pyramidal  ownership  structure  and  ﬁrm  value.
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]
Intercept  −1.464* −1.767* −1.504* −1.418* −1.411** −1.260** −1.163***
[−1.60]  [−1.92]  [−1.65]  [−1.80]  [−2.49]  [−2.45]  [−2.52]
HERFSALES  −0.181* −0.031  −0.059
[−1.71]  [0.19]  [0.41]
HERFSALES*SEP1  −0.337**
[−2.15]
SEP1  0.428**
[2.04]
HERFSALES*SEP2  −0.350**
[−2.16]
SEP2  0.155*
[1.85]
HERFSALES*DVDFC  −1.994*
[−1.86]
DVDFC  0.903* 1.123* 1.269* 0.927* 0.961* 1.131**
[1.69]  [1.75]  [1.86]  [1.76]  [1.90]  [2.54]
ENTROSALES  −0.409*** −0.233
[−1.71]  [−0.40]
ENTROSALES*DVDFC  −0.385***
[−3.55]
NSEC −0.147** −0.079
[−2.23]  [1.52]
NSEC*DVDFC  −0.502**
[−2.43]
DFC1 −0.681** −0.470** −0.697** −0.684** −0.692** −0.906*** −0.950***
[−1.98]  [−2.24]  [−2.04]  [−2.09]  [−2.11]  [−2.74]  [−2.89]
CAPEXSAL 3.475*** 3.546*** 3.443*** 3.412*** 3.408*** 3.557*** 3.491***
[7.26]  [7.34]  [7.28]  [7.52]  [7.49]  [7.94]  [7.80]
LNTA 0.128* 0.080* 0.078* 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.120***
[1.81]  [1.93]  [1.91]  [3.19]  [3.17]  [3.18]  [2.98]
DTTA −1.860*** −1.943*** −2.070*** −1.835*** −1.857*** −1.810** −2.008***
[−4.08] [−4.15]  [−4.46]  [−4.26]  [−4.27]  [−4.18]  [−4.60]
EBITSAL 2.953*** 2.929*** 2.596*** 2.790*** 2.726*** 2.642*** 2.064***
[6.85]  [6.70]  [5.55]  [6.72]  [6.12]  [6.24]  [4.30]
CRISIS −0.246** −0.261** −0.248** −0.350*** −0.352*** −0.325*** −0.326***
[−2.15] [−2.28] [−2.19] [−3.10]  [−3.12]  [−2.89]  [−2.92]
Lambda [] 0.540*** 0.581*** 0.517*** 0.510*** 0.512*** 0.504*** 0.504***
[3.26]  [3.53]  [3.14]  [3.21]  [3.23]  [3.16]  [3.19]
No. obs.  622  622  622  622  622  622  622
Wald Chi2 147.95*** 152.72*** 156.67*** 148.01*** 168.02*** 150.40*** 172.80***
Estimated coefﬁcients [z-statistic] of the ordinary least squares estimates of Eq. (3) (second stage of the Heckman procedure). The
dependent variable is the excess value estimated by sales multiples (EXVALSALES). See the Appendix for an explanation of the independent
variables. Lambda () represents the inverse Mills ratio from the ﬁrst stage of the selection model. We control for time and industry
effects. Wald Chi2 is the joint signiﬁcance test of the coefﬁcients.
* A level of signiﬁcance lower than 10%.
**
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iA level of signiﬁcance lower than 5%.
*** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 1%.
ﬂow  rights  of  the  largest  shareholder  (SEP1  and  SEP2),  the
HERFSALES  and  HERFASSETS  coefﬁcients  are  no  longer  sig-
niﬁcant.  This  result  implies  that  the  diversiﬁcation  discount
does  not  exist  per  se.  Interestingly,  the  interacted  variables
have  a  negative  impact  on  the  ﬁrm  value.  These  estimates
shed  some  light  on  the  possible  reason  of  the  diversiﬁcation
discount  since  the  business  and  ownership  diversiﬁcation
inﬂuence  negatively  the  value  of  the  ﬁrm  when  there  is  a
divergence  between  the  main  shareholders’  voting  rights
5
m
w
ond  cash  ﬂow  rights.  Thus,  the  diversiﬁcation  strategy
an  be  a mean  used  by  controlling  shareholder  to  pursue
heir  own  interests  even  at  expense  of  other  shareholders’
nterests.
To  test  the  robustness  of  our  results,  Columns  4  and
 in  Tables  5  and  6  report  similar  analyses  with  comple-
entary  measures  of  diversiﬁcation.  In  Columns  4  and  5
e  use  the  entropy  of  sales  (ENTROSALES)  and  the  entropy
f  assets  (ENTROASSETS)  as  metrics  of  diversiﬁcation.  The
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Table  6  Ownership  diversiﬁcation,  pyramidal  ownership  structure  and  ﬁrm  value.
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]
Intercept  −3.618*** −3.863*** −3.975*** −3.612*** −3.452*** −3.884*** −3.742***
[−2.99]  [−2.58]  [−4.27]  [−2.93]  [−2.47]  [−3.15]  [−2.67]
HERFASSETS  −0.452* 0.619  0.318
[−1.76]  [1.35]  [1.46]
HERFASSETS*SEP1  −1.300**
[−1.97]
SEP1 0.717**
[2.39]
HERFASSETS*SEP2 −2.315***
[−2.85]
SEP2 0.741***
[2.73]
HERFASSETS*DVDFC  −2.959***
[−2.60]
DVDFC  0.979* 1.096** 0.938* 1.026*** 0.861* 1.075**
[1.84]  [2.16]  [1.87]  [2.32]  [1.94]  [2.51]
ENTROASSETS  −0.320** 0.138
[−2.05]  [0.73]
ENTROASSETS*DVDFC  −3.332***
[2.32]
NSEC −0.126*** 0.007
[−2.68]  [0.13]
NSEC*DVDFC  −0.680**
[−2.51]
DFC1 −1.592*** −0.951*** −1.152*** −1.155*** −1.146*** −1.072*** −1.090***
[−3.46]  [−2.72]  [−3.45]  [−3.27]  [−3.48]  [−3.64]  [−3.35]
CAPEXSAL 0.573  0.201  0.132  0.596  0.142  0.572  0.170
[1.22] [1.38]  [1.25]  [1.28]  [1.27]  [1.24]  [1.33]
LNTA 0.128** 0.150** 0.132* 0.130** 0.118* 0.152*** 0.131**
[2.37]  [2.30]  [1.84]  [2.29]  [1.86]  [2.64]  [2.03]
DTTA −0.667** −1.188* −1.414*** −0.738** −1.425** −0.735** −1.361**
[−2.08] [−1.81]  [−2.19]  [−2.20]  [−2.24]  [−2.20]  [−2.14]
EBITSAL 3.114*** 1.530*** 1.535*** 2.991*** 1.463** 2.811*** 1.438**
[5.44]  [2.61]  [2.52]  [5.11]  [2.47]  [4.77]  [2.44]
CRISIS −0.157* −0.375** −0.333* −0.168** −0.340* −0.200** −0.351**
[−1.98] [−2.10] [1.92]  [−2.06]  [−2.01]  [−2.25]  [−2.07]
Lambda [] 0.875*** 1.367*** 1.379*** 0.838*** 1.365*** 0.844*** 1.369***
[3.82]  [4.34]  [4.64]  [3.61]  [4.63]  [3.67]  [4.66]
No. obs.  622  622  622  622  622  622  622
Wald Chi2 72.36*** 78.87*** 80.50*** 75.70*** 75.64*** 73.83*** 75.81***
Estimated coefﬁcients [z-statistic] of the ordinary least squares estimates of Eq. (3) (second stage of the Heckman procedure). The
dependent variable is excess value estimated by assets multiples (EXVALASSETS). See the Appendix for an explanation of the independent
variables. Lambda () represents the inverse Mills ratio from the ﬁrst stage of the selection model. We control for time and industry
effects. Wald Chi2 is the joint signiﬁcance test of the coefﬁcients.
* A level of signiﬁcance lower than 10%.
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wA level of signiﬁcance lower than 5%.
*** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 1%.
oefﬁcient  of  these  variables  in  Column  4  is  negative,
hich  supports  the  diversiﬁcation  discount  and  corrobo-
ates  Hypothesis  H1a.  Nevertheless,  when  we  introduce  the
nteraction  of  both  variables  with  the  separation  of  voting
ights  and  cash  ﬂow  rights  (DVDCF),  the  diversiﬁcation  per
e  does  no  longer  have  any  signiﬁcant  inﬂuence  on  the  ﬁrm
alue.  Moreover,  the  interacted  variables  (ENTROSALES  and
NTROASSETS  DVDCF)  take  on  the  negative  and  signiﬁcant
oefﬁcient.
w
i
t
mThe  estimates  in  Columns  6  and  7  of  Tables  5  and  6,
hich  report  the  effect  of  the  number  of  industry  segments
n  which  the  ﬁrm  diversiﬁes  (NSEC),  are  robustness  checks
oo.  According  to  these  results,  the  number  of  segments,
hich  proxy  ﬁrm  diversiﬁcation  has  a  negative  relation
ith  the  value  of  the  ﬁrm.  Nevertheless,  once  again,  when
nteracted  with  DVDCF,  NSEC  loses  the  signiﬁcance,  and
he  interacted  variable  becomes  statistically  signiﬁcant.  It
eans  that  a  possible  explanation  of  the  negative  impact  of
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Table  7  Ownership  diversiﬁcation,  pyramidal  ownership
structure  and  ﬁrm  value.
[1]  [2]  [3]
Intercept  −1.298* −1.304* −1.257*
[−1.69]  [−1.71]  [−1.70]
NPART  −0.011* −0.018* −0.028*
[−1.69]  [−1.76]  [−1.65]
PCONTR  0.982*** 0.956*** 1.124***
[5.31]  [4.46]  [5.68]
PCONTR*SEP1  −0.153**
[−1.96]
PCONTR*SEP2  0.720**
[2.24]
CERPT  −0.107
[−0.52]
CERPT*SEP1  0.281
[0.87]
CERPT*SEP2  −0.679
[−1.55]
SEP1 0.370* 0.329*
[2.76]  [1.66]
SEP2 0.390* 0.466*
[1.69]  [1.81]
LNCAPINV  −0.030*** −0.028*** −0.035***
[−3.18]  [−2.53]  [−3.33]
DVDFC  0.395*
[1.84]
DFC1  −0.934*** −0.696** −0.689**
[−2.79]  [−2.45]  [−2.01]
CAPEXSAL  3.378*** 3.456*** 3.385***
[7.29]  [7.48]  [7.02]
LNTA 0.062* 0.054* 0.052*
[1.75]  [1.76]  [1.69]
DTTA −1.849*** −1.938*** −1.879***
[−4.33] [−4.45] [−4.30]
EBITSAL  2.747*** 2.601*** 2.660***
[6.66]  [6.23]  [6.44]
CRISIS −0.232** −0.252** −0.227**
[−2.14] [−2.35] [−2.11]
Lambda  []  0.509*** 0.516*** 0.541***
[3.24]  [3.32]  [3.48]
No. obs.  622  622  622
Wald Chi2 149.75*** 165.54*** 168.90***
Estimated coefﬁcients [z-statistic] of the ordinary least squares
estimates of Eq. (4) (second stage of the Heckman procedure).
The dependent variable is the excess value estimated by sales
multiples (EXVALSALES). See the Appendix for an explanation of
the independent variables. Lambda () represents the inverse
Mills ratio from the ﬁrst stage of the selection model. We  control
for time and industry effects. Wald Chi2 is the joint signiﬁcance
test of the coefﬁcients.
* A level of signiﬁcance lower than 10%.
Table  8  Ownership  diversiﬁcation,  pyramidal  ownership
structure  and  ﬁrm  value.
[1]  [2]  [3]
Intercept  −3.218*** −3.063** −3.124***
[−2.53] [−2.48] [−2.82]
NPART  −0.031* −0.039* −0.026*
[−1.66]  [−1.70]  [−1.68]
PCONTR  0.748*** 0.859*** 0.910***
[2.93]  [2.81]  [3.21]
PCONTR*SEP1  −0.827*
[−1.93]
PCONTR*SEP2  1.684**
[2.04]
CERPT  −0.301
[−1.01]
CERPT*SEP1  0.424
[0.90]
CERPT*SEP2  −0.240
[−0.38]
SEP1 1.183*** 0.894***
[3.55]  [3.10]
SEP2 0.920** 0.350*
[2.30]  [1.94]
LNCAPINV  −0.031** −0.036** −0.051***
[−2.28]  [−2.29]  [−3.31]
DVDFC 0.709**
[2.14]
DFC1  −1.383*** −0.826** −0.691**
[−2.79]  [−2.53]  [−2.21]
CAPEXSAL  0.321  0.528  0.617
[1.46]  [1.12]  [1.23]
LNTA 0.113* 0.090* 0.112*
[1.91]  [1.77]  [1.87]
DTTA −1.352** −1.597** −1.189**
[−2.13] [−2.56] [−1.95]
EBITSAL  2.779*** 2.350*** 2.737***
[4.58]  [3.93]  [4.52]
CRISIS −0.128* −0.169** −0.153**
[−1.80] [−2.10] [−1.97]
Lambda  []  0.856*** 0.780*** 0.896***
[3.68]  [3.51]  [3.91]
No. obs.  622  622  622
Wald Chi2 71.64*** 97.42*** 98.57***
Estimated coefﬁcients [z-statistic] of the ordinary least squares
estimates of Eq. (4) (second stage of the Heckman procedure).
The dependent variable is excess value estimated by assets mul-
tiples (EXVALASSETS). See the Appendix for an explanation of the
independent variables. Lambda () represents the inverse Mills
ratio from the ﬁrst stage of the selection model. We control for
time and industry effects. Wald Chi2 is the joint signiﬁcance test
of the coefﬁcients.
* A level of signiﬁcance lower than 10%.
** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 5%.** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 5%.
*** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 1%.
diversiﬁcation  on  the  ﬁrm  value  has  to  do  with  the  control-
ling  shareholders  using  pyramidal  structures  for  their  own
private  beneﬁts.
On  average,  our  results  show  that  the  diversiﬁcation  dis-
count  relative  to  non-diversiﬁed  ﬁrms  in  the  same  sector
i
4
t
L*** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 1%.
s  around  31.65%  (18.1%  for  business  diversiﬁcation  and
5.2%  for  ownership  diversiﬁcation).  This  ﬁgure  is  higher
han  the  results  reported  by  Berger  and  Ofek  (1995)  and
ins  and  Servaes  (1999,  2002),  and  the  explanation  can
2 M.  Jara-Bertin  et  al.
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Table  9  Ownership  diversiﬁcation,  pyramidal  ownership
structure  and  ﬁrm  value.
[1]  [2]  [3]
Intercept  −0.094  −0.410  −0.411
[−0.59] [−0.39] [−0.35]
NPART  −0.076*** −0.077*** −0.073***
[−4.17]  [−4.29]  [−4.96]
PCONTR  0.760*** 0.894*** 0.956***
[3.48]  [3.23]  [3.30]
PCONTR*SEP1  −0.445**
[−2.20]
PCONTR*SEP2  0.430**
[2.05]
CERPT  −0.330
[−1.09]
CERPT*SEP1  0.286
[0.63]
CERPT*SEP2  −0.244
[−0.40]
SEP1 0.905*** 0.949***
[3.03]  [3.39]
SEP2 1.04** 0.889**
[2.35]  [2.45]
LNCAPINV  −0.037*** −0.054*** −0.048***
[−3.15]  [−3.23]  [−3.13]
DVDFC 1.824***
[3.67]
DFC1  −0.497** −0.264* −0.198*
[−2.03]  [−1.73]  [−1.88]
CAPEXSAL  0.505  0.770  0.820
[1.36]  [1.06]  [1.56]
LNTA 0.032* 0.035* 0.035*
[1.67]  [1.74]  [1.87]
DTTA −0.521** −0.602** −0.394**
[−2.13] [−2.41] [−2.38]
EBITSAL  2.245*** 2.103*** 2.708***
[5.10]  [4.74]  [4.83]
CRISIS −0.422*** −0.431*** −0.338**
[−3.40] [−3.53] [−2.37]
Lambda  []  0.144** 0.213** 0.101**
[2.27]  [2.00]  [1.95]
No. obs.  622  622  622
Wald Chi2 211.56*** 223.80*** 231.79***
Estimated coefﬁcients [z-statistic] of the ordinary least squares
estimates of Eq. (4) (second stage of the Heckman procedure).
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio (MTB). See
the Appendix for an explanation of the independent variables.
Lambda () represents the inverse Mills ratio from the ﬁrst stage
of the selection model. We  control for time and industry effects.
Wald Chi2 is the joint signiﬁcance test of the coefﬁcients.
* A level of signiﬁcance lower than 10%.70  
e  related  to  the  lower  activity  of  the  Chilean  capital
arkets.5
First,  the  Chilean  capital  markets  are  signiﬁcantly  less
ctive  than  the  ones  of  the  developed  and  the  emerging
sian  countries.  Thus,  the  market  value  in  Chile  can  reﬂect
ome  overreaction  related  to  lower  market  activity.  Second,
ighly  diversiﬁed  companies  despite  opening  new  market
hares,  invest  less  in  R&D  so  that  they  have  lower  levels
f  growth  opportunities  in  their  core  activities  as  compared
o  undiversiﬁed  ﬁrms  (Hyland  and  Diltz,  2002).  Third,  this
iscount  could  be  the  result  of  possible  private  beneﬁts  of
ontrol  that  rise  from  the  existence  of  pyramidal  ownership
tructures,  where  controlling  shareholders  can  extract  other
hareholders’  wealth  through  diversiﬁcation  strategies.
Tables  7  and  8  report  the  results  of  the  estimation  of  Eq.
4)  concerning  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation.  The  dependent
ariable  is  the  estimated  excess  value  based  on  sales  mul-
iples  (EXVALSALES)  in  Table  7,  and  the  estimated  excess
alue  based  on  asset  multiples  (EXVALASSETS)  in  Table  8.
he  estimates  of  the  baseline  models  are  reported  in  Col-
mn  1.  We  can  see  that  NPART  (the  number  of  ﬁrms  of  which
he  base  ﬁrm  is  a  shareholder)  has  a  negative  inﬂuence  on
he  ﬁrm  value.  It  conﬁrms  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation  dis-
ount  (Hypothesis  H2a)  since  the  higher  the  diversiﬁcation
in  the  sense  of  number  of  owned  ﬁrms),  the  lower  the  value
f  the  base  ﬁrm.  Nevertheless,  to  some  extent  this  effect
an  be  made  up  for  the  effect  of  the  control  on  the  afﬁli-
ted  ﬁrms  (PCONTR).  The  positive  and  signiﬁcant  effect  of
CONTR  must  be  understood  as  the  positive  view  of  the  mar-
et  when  the  base  ﬁrm  is  not  a  minority  shareholder  but
cquire  the  control  of  the  afﬁliated  ﬁrm.
We  have  to  note  that  this  positive  relation  is  moderated
y  the  level  of  voting-cash  ﬂow  rights  divergence  (PCONTR
EP1  and  PCONTR  SEP1).  Since  the  positive  coefﬁcient  of
his  latter  interacted  variable  exceeds  the  negative  coefﬁ-
ient  of  the  former  one,  there  is  a  net  positive  effect  of  the
eparation  of  rights.  This  positive  impact  can  be  due  to  the
nternal  ﬁnancial  organization  of  business  groups.  The  ﬁrms
ith  high  divergence  between  voting  and  cash  ﬂow  rights  are
sually  parts  of  business  groups,  which  enhance  the  func-
ioning  of  internal  capital  markets.  In  these  sense,  Almeida
nd  Wolfenzon  (2006)  suggest  that,  in  less  developed  capi-
al  markets  (as  Chile  can  be),  the  internal  capital  markets
ttenuate  the  weakness  of  external  capital  markets.  Our
esults  are  also  in  line  with  Buchuk  et  al.  (2014),  who  ﬁnd
hat  internal  capital  markets  inside  Chilean  business  groups
re  an  efﬁcient  way  of  resources  allocation.  Finally,  Column
 shows  that  the  related  sectors  (CERPT)  do  not  play  any
elevant  role  as  a  determinant  of  the  effect  of  ownership
iversiﬁcation.
As  a  robustness  check,  we  run  the  same  analysis  with  the
arket-to-book  ratio  as  a  measure  of  ﬁrm’s  value  (Adam  and
oyal,  2008).  Table  9  shows  the  results,  which  are  fully  con-
istent  with  the  above-reported  ones  and  corroborate  the
wnership  diversiﬁcation  discount  and  the  positive  effect  of
he  divergence  between  voting  rights  and  cash  ﬂow  rights.
5 According to the information provided by the World Bank, the
verage stock trading (scaled by GDP) between 2005 and 2012 was
48% in the USA, 136% for East Asian countries and 20% for Chile.
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*** A level of signiﬁcance lower than 1%.
onclusionse  study  the  effects  of  the  corporate  diversiﬁcation  on  the
alue  of  Chilean  listed  ﬁrms.  The  research  on  this  topic,
asically  focused  on  developed  or  Asian  emerging  countries,
as  documented  a  discount  for  unrelated  diversiﬁcation.
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Nevertheless,  the  question  about  to  which  extent  this  diver-
siﬁcation  discount  holds  in  other  institutional  environments
and  the  potential  impact  of  complex  ownership  structures
is  still  open.
Ownership  pyramids  are  a  control  enhancing  mechanism
widely  used  to  increase  the  dominant  shareholders’  control
rights  over  their  cash  ﬂow  rights.  Since  corporate  diversi-
ﬁcation  can  be  a  decision  of  corporate  insiders  to  pursue
their  own  interests  even  at  expense  of  other  stakeholders’
interests,  the  analysis  of  how  corporate  diversiﬁcation  inter-
acts  with  ownership  structure  arises  as  an  interesting  ﬁeld
of  study.
Our  study  is  the  ﬁrst  to  analyze  the  impact  of  the  diversi-
ﬁcation  strategies  in  an  emerging  market  as  Chile,  a  country
with  a  concentrated  ownership  structure  and  relatively  low
legal  protection  of  investors.  We  study  two  types  of  diver-
siﬁcation:  the  business  diversiﬁcation  and  the  ownership
diversiﬁcation.  The  business  diversiﬁcation  refers  to  the  ﬁrm
segments  in  different  sectors,  and  the  ownership  diversiﬁca-
tion  refers  to  the  ﬁrm  holding  a  fraction  of  the  ownership  of
other  companies.  Given  the  concentrated  ownership  frame-
work  of  Chilean  companies  we  study  not  only  the  relation
between  ﬁrm  diversiﬁcation  and  ﬁrm  value  but  also  to  which
extent  this  relation  is  moderated  by  the  pyramidal  owner-
ship  structure.
We  analyze  a  sample  of  83  nonﬁnancial  companies  listed
in  the  Chilean  capital  markets  from  2005  to  2013.  Our
main  result  is  the  evidence  of  a  discount  for  both  busi-
ness  and  ownership  diversiﬁcation,  which  is  consistent  with
that  reported  for  other  economic  or  institutional  settings.
Second,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  business  diversiﬁcation  discount  is
related  to  the  ownership  structure  and  is  due  to  the  excess  of
the  largest  shareholders  control  rights.  The  high  ownership
concentration  of  Chilean  ﬁrms,  exacerbated  by  the  use  of
ownership  pyramids,  may  result  in  the  ultimate  shareholder
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sing  corporate  diversiﬁcation  to  extract  private  beneﬁts.
ur  results  point  out  that  the  pyramidal  structures  can  be
elated  to  an  inefﬁcient  use  of  resources  and  reduced  value
or  companies.
We  also  ﬁnd  that  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation  discount
ecomes  a  premium  when  the  ownership  diversiﬁcation
nables  the  control  of  other  ﬁrms.  This  result  lends  support
o  the  idea  that  the  indirect  control  of  other  companies  by
 parent  company  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  value  of  the
atter.  Given  the  low  activity  of  the  Chilean  capital  markets,
his  effect  can  be  explained  by  the  improvement  of  inter-
al  capital  markets  that  allow  overcoming  the  limitations  of
xternal  capital  markets.
Our  results  can  be  interesting  both  for  academia,  prac-
itioners,  and  policy  makers.  For  academia,  we  provide
nnovative  research  on  the  joint  effects  of  ownership  struc-
ure  and  corporate  diversiﬁcation  in  a  geographical  area
uch  as  Latin  America  with  a  French  civil  law  system  and
oncentrated  ownership  structure.  For  practitioners  and
nvestors,  we  show  how  some  corporate  control  and  diversi-
cation  issues  affect  the  ﬁrm  market  valuation  and,  thus,
e  suggest  the  need  to  take  them  into  account  when
ssessing  stock  prices.  Policy  makers  can  ﬁnd  in  our  paper
ome  clues  for  further  regulation  of  the  corporate  con-
rol  enhancing  mechanisms  for  the  creation  of  market
alue.
Our  paper  suggests  several  avenues  for  future  research.
ne  of  the  most  promising  ones  is  extending  this  analy-
is  over  a  wide  sample  of  emerging  countries.  In  this  way,
e  could  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  ﬁrm-  and
ountry-level  factors  that  make  diversiﬁcation  strategies
ore  valuable  in  different  legal  and  institutional  environ-
ents.  Another  interesting  ﬁeld  is  studying  the  impact  of
he  ultimate  owner  nature  on  the  diversiﬁcation  premium
r  discount.
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ppendix. Deﬁnition of the variables
bbreviation  Variable  Deﬁnition
alue  measures
EXVALSALES Excess  value  (sales
multiples)
Logarithm  of  the  market  capitalization  over  the  sum  of  segment  imputed  values
using sales  multiples.
EXVALASSETS  Excess  value  (assets
multiples)
Logarithm  of  the  market  capitalization  over  the  sum  of  segment  imputed  values
using assets  multiples.
MTB Market-to-book  (Market  value  of  equity  +  book  value  of  debt)/Book  value  of  the  assets.
usiness diversiﬁcation  measures
HERFSALES  Inverse  Herﬁndahl  index
of  sales
Absence  of  concentration  of  sales  across  unrelated  segments.
ENTROSALES  Entropy  of  sales  Index  to  measure  the  diversiﬁcation  on  sales  across  different  levels  of  industry
aggregation.  Estimated  as  the  sum  of  the  percentages  of  sales  from  the  i-segment
multiplied  for  the  logarithm  of  the  inverse  of  the  percentage  of  sales  from  the
i-segment.
HERFASSETS  Inverse  Herﬁndahl  index
of  assets
Absence  of  concentration  of  assets  across  unrelated  segments.
ENTROASSETS  Entropy  of  assets  Index  to  measure  the  diversiﬁcation  on  assets  across  different  levels  of  industry
aggregation.  Estimated  as  the  sum  of  the  percentages  of  assets  from  the
i-segment  multiplied  for  the  logarithm  of  the  inverse  of  the  percentage  of  assets
from the  i-segment.
NSEC Number  of  segments  Number  of  industry  segments  in  which  the  ﬁrm  participate.
DIV Unrelated  diversiﬁcation  1  if  the  base  ﬁrm  is  diversiﬁed,  and  zero  otherwise.
wnership  diversiﬁcation  measures
NPART  Number  of  ﬁrms  Number  of  ﬁrms  in  whose  ownership  the  base  ﬁrm  has  a  stake.
PCONTR Control  proportion  Proportion  of  ﬁrms  that  are  controlled  by  the  base  ﬁrm  over  NPART.
CERTP Related  subsidiaries  Proportion  of  ﬁrms  controlled  on  related  industry  segments  over  total  of
controlled  ﬁrms.
LNCAPINV  Invested  capital  Natural  logarithm  of  total  capital  invested  in  other  ﬁrms.
DIVINV Ownership  diversiﬁcation  1  if  the  base  ﬁrm  participates  in  the  ownership  of  other  ﬁrms,  and  zero  otherwise.
DVDFC Excess  of  voting  rights  Voting  rights  minus  cash  ﬂow  rights  of  the  ultimate  owner  of  the  ﬁrm.
DFC1 Cash  ﬂow  rights  Cash  ﬂow  rights  of  the  ultimate  owner  of  the  ﬁrm.
DV1 Voting  rights  Voting  rights  of  the  last  owner  of  the  ﬁrm.
SEP1/SEP2  Levels  of  DVDFC  1  if  DVDFC  is  higher/lower  than  the  mean,  and  0  otherwise.
irm-level  control  variables
CAPEXSAL  Investment  ratio  Capital  expenditures  over  sales.
LNTA Size  of  the  company  Natural  logarithm  of  total  assets.
DTTA Debt  Total  debt  to  total  assets.
EBITSAL  EBIT  margin  EBIT  over  sales.
CRISIS Financial  crisis  period  1  for  2008  and  2009,  and  zero  otherwise.
ountry/industry-level  control  variables
CRECGDP  Economic  growth  GDP  growth  rate.
PNDIV  Proportion  of  diversiﬁed
companies
Percentage  of  companies  from  the  primary  industry  that  are  diversiﬁed.
PSDIV Diversiﬁed  sales
proportion
Proportion  of  sales  of  the  diversiﬁed  companies  over  total  sales  of  the  industry.
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